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Abstract
The semireactive bargaining set, a solution for cooperative games, is introduced.
This solution is in general a subsolution of the bargaining set and a supersolution
of the reactive bargaining set. However, on various classes of transferable utility
games the semireactive and the reactive bargaining set coincide. The semireactive
prebargaining set on TU games can be axiomatized by one-person rationality, the
reduced game property, a weak version of the converse reduced game property with
respect to subgrand coalitions, and subgrand stability. Furthermore, it is shown
that there is a suitable weakening of subgrand stability, which allows to character-
ize the prebargaining set. Replacing the reduced game by the imputation saving
reduced game and employing individual rationality as an additional axiom yields
chracterizations of both, the bargaining set and the semireactive bargaining set.
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The semireactive bargaining set is a set-valued solution of cooperative transferable utility
games. Its deﬁnition is strongly related to the deﬁnition (see Aumann and Maschler
(1964)) of the bargaining set M = M
(i)
1 . The only diﬀerence between the deﬁnitions of
the two bargaining sets is that in the classical one the “objector” (player k objects against
some “partner” l) has to announce his objection in advance, whereas in the deﬁnition of
the semireactive bargaining set the objector only has to announce in advance the coalition
which he plans to object with. The “complete” objection is announced ex post, i.e., after
his partner has already announced the coalition which he will try to counter object with
(if there is one). In view of the fact that the objector may react to the coalition announced
by player l, the semireactive bargaining set is a subset of the classical bargaining set. In
the deﬁnition of the reactive bargaining set, introduced by Granot (1994), the objector is
allowed to wait with his objection until his partner has announced his defending coalition.
Therefore we use the expression “semireactive”. Indeed, the semireactive bargaining set
contains the reactive bargaining set and is contained in the classical bargaining set.
Though in general larger than the reactive bargaining set, the semireactive bargaining
set is easier to compute than the classical one. Moreover, it coincides with the reactive
bargaining set for various classes of games. Like the mentioned well-known bargaining
sets the notion of the semireactive bargaining set can be extended to nontransferable
utility games. One of the main results (Theorem 3.1) shows that the semireactive prebar-
gaining set has an axiomatization that is similar to Peleg’s (1986) axiomatization of the
prekernel. Moreover, a suitable modiﬁcation of this axiomatization also characterizes the
semireactive bargaining set.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 1 the notation and some deﬁnitions are
presented. Moreover, it is shown that the semireactive bargaining set can be described
as a ﬁnite union of polytopes. This description can be used to calculate the semireactive
(pre)bargaining set of a generic TU game.
In Section 2 it turns out that the semireactive prebargaining set satisﬁes anonymity,
covariance under strategic equivalence, and the reduced game property with respect to
“Davis-Maschler” (1965) reduced games. Subgrand stability, a property which excludes the
possibility that subgrand coalitions (coalitions that contain all but one player) can be used
in a justiﬁed objection, is introduced and it is shown that the semireactive prebargaining
set satisﬁes an appropriate version of the converse reduced game property. If the Davis-
Maschler reduced game is replaced by the imputations saving reduced game in the sense of
Snijders (1995), then the semireactive bargaining set is shown to satisfy both, the reduced
game property and a suitable version of the converse reduced game property. Indeed, this
converse reduced game property requires subgrand stable imputations.
Section 3 is devoted to axiomatize the semireactive prebargaining set. In fact, one-person
rationality, subgrand stability, the reduced game property, and the appropriate version
of the converse reduced game property are logically independent axioms which deter-
mine the semireactive prebargaining set. If the Davis-Maschler reduced game is replaced
by the Snijders reduced game, then the semireactive bargaining set can be axiomatized
2analogously, when individual rationality is added to the axioms. The axiomatization of
the semireactive prebargaining set is similar to the well-known axiomatization (see Peleg
(1986)) of the prekernel. However, the axiomatization of the semireactive bargaining set
does not lead to an analogous characterization of the kernel.
Section 4 shows that the semireactive prebargaining set satisﬁes reasonableness, thus
the nullplayer property, if the considered games are superadditive. For superadditive
simple games it turns out that the semireactive bargaining set coincides with the positive
prekernel (see Peleg and Sudh¨ olter (1998)) and, thus, with the reactive bargaining set.
In Section 5 it is shown that subgrand stability can be weakened in such a way that it
can be used to characterize the classical (pre)bargaining set. We admit that this weaker
property is also less intuitive.
Section 6 brieﬂy describes how the deﬁnition of the semireactive (pre)bargaining set can
be extended to TU games with coalition structures and to NTU games. Moreover, a
set-valued dynamic system is presented which leads to the semireactive (pre)bargaining
set and which can be seen as the suitable analogon to the one leading to the reactive
bargaining set (see Granot and Maschler (1997)).
1 Notation and Deﬁnitions
Let U be a set (the universe of players). A cooperative game with transferable utility
(a TU game) – a game – is a pair (N,v), where N is a ﬁnite nonvoid subset of U and
v : 2N → I R, v(∅) = 0 is a mapping (the coalitional function). Here 2N = {S ⊆ N} is the
set of coalitions of (N,v). Let ΓU denote the set of all games.
The set of feasible payoﬀ vectors of a game (N,v) is denoted by
X(N,v) = {x ∈ I R
N | x(N) ≤ v(N)},
whereas
I
∗(N,v) = {x ∈ I R
N | x(N) = v(N)}
is the set of preimputations of (N,v) and
I(N,v) = {x ∈ I
∗(N,v) | xk ≥ v({k}) ∀k ∈ N}
is the set of individually rational preimputations (imputations) of (N,v). Here
x(S) = Σi∈Sxi (x(∅) = 0)
for each x ∈ I RN and S ⊆ N. Additionally, let xS denote the restriction of x to S, i.e.
xS = (xi)i∈S ∈ I R
S.
For disjoint coalitions S,T ⊆ N and x ∈ I RN let (xS,xT) = xS∪T. Let ΓI
U = {(N,v) ∈ ΓU |
P
i∈N v({i}) ≤ v(N)} denote the set of games which possess nonempty sets of imputations.
3A solution σ on a set Γ of games is a mapping that assigns a set σ(N,v) ⊆ X(N,v) to
every game (N,v) ∈ Γ.
If Γ is not speciﬁed, then σ is a solution on ΓU.
Let (N,v) be a game, x ∈ I RN, and k,l ∈ N be distinct players. Deﬁne the collection
Tkl(N) by
Tkl = Tkl(N) = {S ⊆ N \ {l} | k ∈ S}.
Hence, Tkl is the set of coalitions containing k and not containing l. An objection of k
against l at x (w.r.t. (N,v)) is a pair (P,y) satisfying
P ∈ Tkl, y ∈ I R
P, y(P) = v(P), and y > > xP (i.e., yi > xi ∀i ∈ P).
If (P,y) has these properties, then we say that k is able to object against l via coalition
P. Note that k is able to object against l via S ∈ Tkl, if and only if the excess e(S,x,v) =
v(S) − x(S) is strictly positive.
A counter objection to an objection (P,y) of k against l at x is a pair (Q,z) satisfying
Q ∈ Tlk, z ∈ I R
Q, z(Q) = v(Q), z ≥ xQ, and zP∩Q ≥ yP∩Q.
If (Q,z) has these properties, then we say that l is able to counter (P,y) via coalition Q.
Note that l can counter (P,y) via Q ∈ Tlk, if and only if e(Q,x,v) ≥ y(P ∩Q)−x(P ∩Q).
Deﬁnition 1.1 The semireactive prebargaining set M∗
sr(N,v) of a game (N,v) is
the set of all preimputations x ∈ I∗(N,v) that satisfy the following condition for any pair
of distinct players (k,l) ∈ N × N and for any P ∈ Tkl :
There is Q ∈ Tlk such that any objection of k against l via P can be countered by l via Q.




of individually rational elements of the semireactive prebargaining set.
Let (N,v) be a game and x ∈ I RN. In order to compare the deﬁnitions of the “classical”
bargaining set, the reactive bargaining set, and the semireactive bargaining set, we deﬁne
three relations =N,v,x, r=N,v,x
r , and sr=N,v,x
sr on N.
(1) k  l, if:
∀ P ∈ Tkl with e(P,x,v) > 0 and
∀ y ∈ I Rp with y(P) = v(P), y > > xP
∃ Q ∈ Tlk such that
∃ z ∈ I RQ with z(Q) = v(Q), z ≥ xQ, zP∩Q ≥ yP∩Q
(1.1)
4(2) k r l, if
∃ Q ∈ Tlk such that
∀ P ∈ Tkl with e(P,x,v) > 0 and
∀ y ∈ I Rp with y(P) = v(P), y > > xP
∃ z ∈ I RQ with z(Q) = v(Q), z ≥ xQ, zP∩Q ≥ yP∩Q
(1.2)
(3) k sr l, if
∀ P ∈ Tkl with e(P,x,v) > 0
∃ Q ∈ Tlk such that
∀ y ∈ I Rp with y(P) = v(P), y > > xP
∃ z ∈ I RQ with z(Q) = v(Q), z ≥ xQ, zP∩Q ≥ yP∩Q
(1.3)
We shall say that player k has a justiﬁed objection against player l at x in the sense of the
bargaining set, reactive bargaining set, or semireactive bargaining set, respectively, if
k  l, k r l, or k sr l, repectively.
The prebargaining set M∗(N,v) (see Aumann and Maschler (1964)) and the reactive pre-
bargaining set M∗
r(N,v) (see Granot (1994)) is the set of all preimputations such that no
player has a justiﬁed objection against any other player in the sense of the prebargaining
set or reactive prebargaining set respectively. Note that the condition leading to the reac-
tive prebargaining set (1.2) arises from the condition leading to the prebargaining set (1.1)
by exchanging the order of two quantiﬁers. In fact (1.2) arises from (1.1) by exchanging
the ﬁrst and the third row. The bargaining set M(N,v) and the reactive bargaining set
Mr(N,v) arise from the corresponding prebargaining sets by their intersection with the
set of imputations.
A diﬀerent change of the order (see 1.3) leads to the semireactive (pre)bargaining set (see
Deﬁnition 1.1). In fact (1.3) arises from (1.1) by exchanging the second and the third
row. In view of the fact that









Mr(N,v) ⊆ Msr(N,v) ⊆ M(N,v).
The mentioned prebargaining sets are nonempty and the mentioned bargaining sets are
nonempty provided that the set of imputations is nonempty. Indeed, the prekernel
K
∗(N,v) = {x ∈ I
∗(N,v) | skl(x,v) = slk(x,v) ∀k,l ∈ N,k 6= l}
is a nonempty set (see Davis and Maschler (1965)). Here skl(x,v) = maxS∈Tkl e(S,x,v)
denotes the maximal surplus of k over l. The prekernel of a game is contained in its
reactive prebargaining set (see Granot (1994)). Moreover, the kernel
K(N,v) = {x ∈ I(N,v) | skl(x,v) ≤ slk(x,v) or xl = v({l}) ∀k,l ∈ N,k 6= l}
5is a nonempty subset of the reactive bargaining set, if I(N,v) 6= ∅. Also the core
C(N,v) = {x ∈ I(N,v) | e(S,x,v) ≤ 0 ∀S ⊆ N}
is a subset of Mr(N,v). Peleg and Sudh¨ olter (1998) introduced a solution which contains
both, the prekernel and the core. This solution is the positive prekernel
K
∗
+(N,v) = {x ∈ I
∗(N,v) | (skl(x,v))+ = (slk(x,v))+ ∀k,l ∈ N,k 6= l},
where t+ = max{0,t} denotes the positive part of the real number t. If some player has
an objection via some coalition P, then e(P,x,v) > 0. If x is a member of the positive
prekernel of a game, then every objection of player k against player l can be countered







Similarly it can be shown that the positive kernel
K+(N,v) = {x ∈ I(N,v) | skl(x,v) ≤ (slk(x,v))+ or xl = v({l}) ∀k,l ∈ N,k 6= l}
contains the core and the kernel and is contained in the reactive bargaining set.
Example 2.3 of Peleg and Sudh¨ olter (1998) presents a game (N,v) whose core is a singleton
and which satisﬁes




r(N,v), and Mr(N,v) ⊂ M(N,v),
where “⊂” means “proper subset”. The following examples show that the reactive bar-
gaining set may be a proper subset of the semireactive bargaining set and that the semire-
active bargaining set may be a proper subset of the classical bargaining set. Example 4.4
shows that the positive (pre)kernel may be a proper subset of the reactive bargaining set
even if the game is superadditive.
Example 1.2 (1) Let (N,v) be deﬁned by N = {1,2,3,4} and
v(S) =

        
        
8, if S = N
6, if |S| = 3 or

|S| = 2 and 1 ∈ S

5, if |S| = 2 and 1 / ∈ S
0, otherwise
.
We shall show that x = (2,2,2,2) ∈ Msr(N,v) \ Mr(N,v). Note that interchange-
able players do not have any justiﬁed objection among each other in the sense of
any bargaining set, as long as they are treated equally. (Players k and l are inter-
changeable, if v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S ∪ {l}) ∀S ⊆ N \ {k,l}.) In our example players
2,3,4 are interchangeable and treated equally.
In order to show that x belongs to the semireactive bargaining set, ﬁrst observe that
s1k(x,v) = 2 > sk1(x,v) = 1 for every k ∈ {2,3,4}, thus every objection of k against
61 can be countered by a coalition Q attaining s1,k = e(Q,x,v). Moreover, player 1
can only object against k via some coalition P = {1,j} for some j ∈ {2,3,4}\{k}.
Any of these objections can be countered via the complement coalition.
In order to prove that x / ∈ Mr(N,v) we show that 1 has a justiﬁed objection against
4 in the sense of the reactive bargaining set. Indeed, it suﬃces to show that for any
Q ∈ T41 with e(Q,x,v) ≥ 0 there is a coalition P ∈ T14 that satisﬁes Q∩P 6= ∅ and
e(P,x,v) > e(Q,x,v). If Q = {2,3,4}, then P = {1,2} has the desired properties.
If Q = {j,4} for some j ∈ {2,3}, then P = {1,j} has the desired properties.
(2) Let (N,v) be deﬁned by N = {1,2,3,4} and
v(S) =

        
        
6, if |S| ≥ 3
5, if |S| = 2 and 1 / ∈ S
2, if |S| = 2 and 1 ∈ S
0, otherwise
.
We shall show that x = (0,2,2,2) ∈ M(N,v) \ Msr(N,v).
Players 2,3,4 are interchangeable and they are treated equally. Moreover, none of
them has a justiﬁed objection against 1, because x1 = v({1}). Player 1 can only
object against l ∈ {2,3,4} via P = N\{l}. If (P,y) is an objection of 1 against l, then
there exists j ∈ P\{1} with yj < 3, thus (Q,z), deﬁned by Q = {j,l}, zl = 2, zj = 3
is a counter objection.
We show that 1 has a justiﬁed objection against 4 in the sense of the semireactive
bargaining set. Indeed, let P = {1,2,3}. If Q = {j,4} for some j = 2,3, then there
is an objection (P,y) which cannot be countered via Q, because e(Q,x,v) = 1 <
2 = e(P,x,v) and P ∩ Q 6= ∅.
In what follows we show that the semireactive prebargaining set is a ﬁnite union of convex
polytopes. To this end we ﬁrst present an equivalent formulation of (1.3). Let (N,v) be
a game, x ∈ I RN, and k,l ∈ N be two distinct players. Then k sr l holds true, if and
only if the following condition is satisﬁed:
∀P ∈ Tkl with e(P,x,v) > 0 ∃Q ∈ Tlk such that

e(Q,x,v) ≥ 0 and Q ∩ P = ∅

or e(Q,x,v) ≥ e(P,x,v)
(1.4)
In order to verify the equivalence of (1.4) and (1.3) ﬁrst assume that (1.3) is valid. Let
P ∈ Tkl be a coalition with e(P,x,v) > 0 and let Q ∈ Tlk be a coalition which satisﬁes
the property required in (1.3). If Q ∩ P = ∅, then (1.3) implies the existence of z ∈ I RQ
with z(Q) = v(Q) and z ≥ xQ, thus e(Q,x,v) = z(Q) − x(Q) ≥ 0. If P ∩ Q 6= ∅, then





xj + /|P \ Q|, if j ∈ P \ Q
xj + (e(P,x,v) − )/|P ∩ Q|, if j ∈ P ∩ Q
.
7Then y(P) = v(P) and y > > xP whenever  is small enough. Moreover, (y−x)(P∩Q) tends
to e(P,x,v), if  tends to 0. If z ∈ I RQ satisﬁes z(Q) = v(Q), z ≥ xQ and zP∩Q ≥ yP∩Q,
then e(Q,x,v) = z(Q)−x(Q) ≥ (z−x)(Q∩P) ≥ (y−x)(Q∩P), thus e(Q,x,v) ≥ e(P,x,v)
in this case. To show the opposite direction let Q ∈ Tlk be a coalition which has the
property required in (1.4) and let y ∈ I RP satisfy y(P) = v(P) and y > > xP. If P ∩Q = ∅,
then z ∈ I RQ, deﬁned by zj = xj for j ∈ Q\{l} and zl = xl +e(Q,x,v), is a vector which
can be used in (1.3). If P ∩ Q 6= ∅, then deﬁne z by
zj =

     
     
yj, if j ∈ P ∩ Q
xj, if j ∈ Q \ (P ∪ {l})
xl + e(Q,x,v) + (x − y)(P ∩ Q), if j = l
.
Then zl ≥ xl, thus z can be used in (1.3).
In order to show that M∗
sr(N,v) is a ﬁnite union of polyhedral sets, deﬁne P = {(P,k,l) |
k ∈ P ⊆ N \ {l}, l ∈ N \ {k}}. Moreover, for R,Q ⊆ N with R \ Q 6= ∅ 6= Q \ R deﬁne
the halfspaces
XR = {x ∈ I∗ | e(R,x,v) ≤ 0},
Y Q = {x ∈ I∗ | e(Q,x,v) ≥ 0}, and
ZR,Q = {x ∈ I∗ | e(Q,x,v) ≥ e(R,x,v)}.
Let Q denote the collection of all halfplanes of the form XR, Y Q, and ZR,Q. We call a
map λ : P → Q feasible, if it satisﬁes
λ(P,k,l) = XR ⇒ R = P,
λ(P,k,l) = Y Q ⇒ Q ∈ Tlk and P ∩ Q = ∅, and
λ(P,k,l) = ZR,Q ⇒ R = P, Q ∈ Tlk and P ∩ Q 6= ∅.
By (1.4) a preimputation x belongs to M∗(N,v), if and only if there is a feasible mapping
λ such that




Indeed, if x ∈ M∗(N,v), k,l ∈ N are distinct players, and if P ∈ Tkl, then one of the
following three cases can occur. (1) e(P,x,v) < 0, i.e., k has no objection via P. In
this case deﬁne λ(P,k,l) = XP. (2) e(P,x,v) > 0 and there is a coalition Q ∈ Tlk with
Q ∩ P = ∅ and e(Q,x,v) ≥ 0. In this case deﬁne λ(P,k,l) = Y Q. (3) e(P,x,v) > 0 and
there is a coalition Q ∈ Tlk with Q∩ P 6= ∅ and e(Q,x,v) ≥ e(P,x,v). In this case deﬁne
λ(P,k,l) = ZP,Q. The deﬁnition of λ implies that x ∈ λ(P,k,l) is true. Conversely, if
x ∈ λ(P,k,l) for some feasible λ, then three cases can occur. (1) λ(P,k,l) = XP. In
this case there is no objection via P. (2) λ(P,k,l) = Y Q. In this case every objection
of k against l can be countered via Q, because Q ∩ P = ∅ and e(Q,x,v) ≥ 0. (3)
λ(P,k,l) = ZP,Q. In this case every objection of k against l via P can be countered via








It should be noted that there is a distinguished feasible λ which satisﬁes Aλ = C(N,v)
(namely the map λ given by λ(P,k,l) = XP ∀(P,k,l) ∈ P).
Theorem 1.3 If (N,v) is a game, then M∗
sr(N,v) is a ﬁnite union of polytopes.
The following well-known result can be used to prove Theorem 1.3.
Lemma 1.4 If (N,v) is a game, then M∗(N,v) is bounded.
For the sake of completeness we prove Lemma 1.4 below.
Proof of Theorem 1.3: For every feasible mapping λ the set Aλ is the intersection
of ﬁnitely many halfspaces and, thus, a polyhedral set. There are ﬁnitely many feasible
maps λ. Therefore the semireactive prebargaining set is a ﬁnite union of polyhedral sets
by equation (1.5). In view of the fact that the semireactive prebargaining set is contained
in the classical prebargaining set, Lemma 1.4 completes the proof. q.e.d.
Proof of Lemma 1.4: In view of the well-known fact that the prebargaining set satisﬁes
covariance under strategic equivalence (see property (2) of Section 2), we may assume
without loss of generality that (N,v) is monotonic, i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N,
and strictly positive, i.e., v(T) > 0 for all ∅ 6= T ⊆ N. As M∗(N,v) ⊆ I∗(N,v) it
suﬃces to show that x ∈ I∗(N,v) with xl > v(N) for some l ∈ N implies that x is not a
member of M∗(N,v). To this end deﬁne P = {i ∈ N | xi < 0} and observe that P 6= ∅,
because x(N) = v(N) > 0. With y ∈ I RP deﬁned by yi = v(P)/|P| it suﬃces to show
that (P,y) constitutes a justiﬁed objection of an arbitrary player k ∈ P against l. Indeed,
this objection cannot be countered via any coalition Q ∈ Tlk, because
v(Q) − y(Q ∩ P) − x(Q \ P) ≤ v(Q) − x(Q \ P) ≤ v(Q) − xl < v(Q) − v(N) ≤ 0
is true. q.e.d.
2 Properties of the Semireactive Bargaining Set
The main aim of this section is to show that the semireative prebargaining set satisﬁes
the reduced game property and a weak form of the converse reduced game property.
Moreover, it is shown that it also satisﬁes some other well-known axioms.
Some convenient and well-known properties of a solution σ on a set Γ of games are as
follows.
9(1) σ is anonymous (satisﬁes AN), if for each (N,v) ∈ Γ and each bijective mapping
τ : N → N0 with (N0,τv) ∈ Γ
σ(N
0,τv) = τ(σ(N,v))
holds (where (τv)(T) = v(τ−1(T)), τj(x) = xτ−1j (x ∈ I RN, j ∈ N0, T ⊆ N0)).
(2) σ is covariant under strategic equivalence (satisﬁes COV), if for (N,v),(N,w) ∈ Γ
with w = αv + β for some α > 0,β ∈ I RN
σ(N,w) = ασ(N,v) + β
holds. The games v and w are called strategically equivalent.
(3) σ satisﬁes nonemptiness (NE), if σ(N,v) 6= ∅ for (N,v) ∈ Γ.
(4) σ is Pareto optimal (satisﬁes PO), if σ(N,v) ⊆ I∗(N,v) for (N,v) ∈ Γ.
(5) σ satisﬁes the nullplayer property (NPP), if for every (N,v) ∈ Γ every x ∈ σ(N,v)
satisﬁes xi = 0 for every nullplayer i ∈ N. Here i is nullplayer if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S)
for S ⊆ N.
(6) σ is reasonable (satisﬁes REAS), if
xi ≥ min{v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) | S ⊆ N \ {i}} (2.1)
and
xi ≤ max{v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) | S ⊆ N \ {i}} (2.2)
for i ∈ N,(N,v) ∈ Γ, and x ∈ σ(N,v).
It is well-known that both, the classical and the reactive (pre)bargaining set satisfy
anonymity, covariance under strategic equivalence, and Pareto optimality. Every of the
mentioned prebargaining sets also satisﬁes nonemptiness. Moreover, if Γ ⊆ ΓI
U, then the
bargaining sets satisfy NE. The semireactive (pre)bargaining set satisﬁes PO by deﬁnition.
A proof of AN and COV is straightforward and left to the reader.
In general none of the mentioned bargaining sets satisfy the nullplayer property or rea-
sonableness (Note that REAS implies NPP). However, in Section 4 it will be shown that
the semireactive (pre)bargaining set satisﬁes REAS on the set of superadditive games.
We recall the deﬁnitions of the reduced game (see Davis and Maschler (1965)) and of the
reduced game property and its converse (see Sobolev (1975) and Peleg (1986)).
Let (N,v) be a game, let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, and x ∈ X(N,v). The reduced game w.r.t. S and x




     
     
0, if T = ∅
v(N) − x(N \ S), if T = S
max{v(T ∪ Q) − x(Q) | Q ⊆ N \ S}, otherwise
.
10Deﬁnition 2.1 Let σ be a solution on a set Γ of games. Then σ satisﬁes the
(1) reduced game property (RGP), if the following condition holds: If (N,v) ∈
Γ, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, and x ∈ σ(N,v), then (S,vS,x) ∈ Γ and xS ∈ σ(S,vS,x).
(2) converse reduced game property (CRGP), if the following condition holds:
If (N,v) ∈ Γ with |N| ≥ 3, if x ∈ I∗(N,v), and if for every S ⊆ N with 2 ≤
|S| ≤ |N|−1 the reduced game (S,vS,x) is a member of Γ and xS ∈ σ(S,vS,x), then
x ∈ σ(N,v).
Note that the converse reduced game property as deﬁned by Peleg (1986) only requires
that the reduced games w.r.t. two-person coalitions have to be taken into consideration.
However, for the solutions that have been axiomatized with the help of the converse
reduced game property, i.e. the prekernel, the core (Peleg (1986,1989)), and the positive
prekernel (Peleg and Sudh¨ olter (1998)), even our weaker version of the converse reduced
game property is suitable to replace the “classical” version in all characterizations.
It is well-known (see Peleg (1988) and Granot and Maschler (1997)) that both the classical
prebargaining set and the reactive prebargaining set satisfy the reduced game property.
We shall now show that the semireactive prebargaining set satisﬁes RGP.
Lemma 2.2 The semireactive bargaining set satisﬁes the reduced game property.
Proof: Let (N,v) be a game, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, and x ∈ M∗
sr(N,v). With w = vS,x we have
to show that xS ∈ M∗
sr(S,w). To this end let k,l ∈ S, k 6= l and P ∈ Tkl(S) satisfy
e(P,xS,w) > 0. We have to prove that there exists a coalition Q ⊆ Tlk(S) such that
either Q ∪ P = ∅ and e(Q,xS,w) ≥ 0 or e(Q,xS,w) ≥ e(P,xS,w) (see equation (1.4)).
Let R ⊆ N \S such that w(P) is attained by P ∪R, i.e., w(P) = v(P ∪R)−x(R). Then
there is a coalition of the form Q∪T ∈ Tlk(N), Q ⊆ S, T ⊆ N \S such that either Q∪T
does not intersect P ∪ R and possesses a nonnegative excess or the coalitions intersect
and e(Q ∪ T,x,v) ≥ e(P ∪ R,x,v). In both cases (1.4) is valid. q.e.d.
Note that none of the prebargaining sets satisﬁes CRGP in general. In order to give
an example we assume that N = {1,2,3} ⊆ U and (N,v) is given by v({1,2}) =
1, v({1,3}) = v({2,3}) = v(∅) = v(N) = 0, and v(S) = −1, otherwise. Then the
imputation x = (0,0,0) does not even belong to the classical bargaining set, because
({1,2},(1/2,1/2)) is a justiﬁed objection of 1 against 3 at x. However, it can easily be
checked that xS ∈ M∗
r(S,vS,x) holds true for every nonempty proper subcoalition S of N.
The preceding example motivates the deﬁnition of a more restricted version of the converse
reduced game property. Indeed, it is possible to weaken the converse reduced game
property in such a way that the semireactive prebargaining set satisﬁes the weaker version.
On the other hand our modiﬁcation of the converse reduced game property together
with other properties will be used to characterize the semireactive prebargaining set (see
Section 3) by implying that it is the maximum solution that satisﬁes the remaining axioms.
Therefore we shall, on the one side, weaken CRGP by requiring that the “reference” vector
x of Deﬁnition 2.1 (2) does not only satisfy Pareto optimality but also an additional
11condition which we shall call subgrand stability. On the other hand our converse reduced
game property will be stronger, because it can even be applied to one-person reduced
games of a two-person game. In order to explicitly formulate the suitable converse reduced
game property a new axiom is deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 2.3 A feasible payoﬀ vector x ∈ X(N,v) of a game (N,v) is subgrand
stable if, for all l ∈ N with xl > v({l}) and x(N \ {l}) < v(N \ {l}), the intersection
of all coalitions Q with l ∈ Q and e(Q,x,v) ≥ e(N \ {l},x,v) consists of player l only.
A solution σ on a set Γ of games satisﬁes subgrand stability (SGS), if for all games
(N,v) ∈ Γ all members x ∈ σ(N,v) are subgrand stable.
In order to give an interpretation of subgrand stability, assume l has the properties re-
quired in Deﬁnition 2.3. Then N\{l} is treated unsatisfactorily by x, because this coalition
has a positive excess. Nevertheless the vector x may be considered a “stable” proposal,
because the remaining player l as well – though treated satisfactorily as a single player
– “has” a coalition which contains himself, which does not contain an arbitrary player of
N \{l}, and which is treated as least as unsatisfactorily as N \{l}. In the foregoing sense
player l is a very signiﬁcant player in many coalitions that are treated at least as bad as
N \{l}. Indeed, he possesses the following “strong argument” to defend his payoﬀ: “Yes,
I know, you altogether have a positive excess but look at all the coalitions containing
myself that have an excess that is at least as high as yours. I am the unique member of
all of these coalitions. Therefore it is unreasonable to decrease my payoﬀ. Moreover, if
you will do that nevertheless, then you will also hurt coalitions of which some of you are
members of.”
Lemma 2.4 The semireactive (pre)bargaining set satisﬁes subgrand stability.
Proof: Let (N,v), x, l satisfy the conditions of Deﬁnition 2.3. If there is some player
k 6= l who belongs to every coalition Q satisfying l ∈ Q and e(Q,x,v) ≥ e(N \ {l},x,v),
then k has a justiﬁed objection against l via N \ {l}. Indeed, if Q ∈ Tlk(N) satisﬁes
e(Q,x,v) ≥ 0, then Q 6= {l}. However, there is no such Q which satisﬁes e(Q,x,v) ≥
e(N \ {l},x,v), thus there is an objection of k against l via N \ {l} which cannot be
countered via Q. q.e.d.
Note that subgrand stability rules out justiﬁed objections in the sense of the semireactive
bargaining set via any “subgrand coalition”, i.e., a coalition of the form N \ {l}. Note
furthermore that the reactive (pre)bargaining set satisﬁes SGS, because it is contained in
the semireactive (pre)bargaining set.
With the help of subgrand stability the converse reduced game property can be modiﬁed
in a suitable way.
Deﬁnition 2.5 A solution σ on a set Γ of games satisﬁes the converse reduced game
property restricted to subgrand stable preimputations (CRGPsr), if the following
condition holds: If (N,v) ∈ Γ with |N| ≥ 2, if x ∈ I∗(N,v) satisﬁes subgrand stability,
and if for every S ⊆ N with 1 ≤ |S| ≤ |N| − 1 the reduced game (S,vS,x) is a member of
Γ and xS ∈ σ(S,vS,x), then x ∈ σ(N,v).
12Lemma 2.6 The semireactive prebargaining set satisﬁes CRGPsr on any set Γ of games.
Proof: Let x be any subgrand stable preimputation of a game (N,v) ∈ Γ with at least
two players such that the (|N|−1)-person reduced games are members of Γ. Moreover, we
assume that x does not belong to the semireactive prebargaining set of (N,v). By (1.4)
there are distinct players k and l of N and a coalition P ∈ Tkl(N) with e(P,x,v) > 0 such





0, if Q ∩ P = ∅
e(P,x,v), if Q ∩ P 6= ∅
.




. Let S = N\{j}
and w = vS,x. The straightforward proof that k has a justiﬁed objection against l in the
sense of the semireactive bargaining set at xS w.r.t the reduced game (namely via P) is
skipped. q.e.d.
In Section 3 it will be shown that the reactive prebargaining set does not satisfy CRGPsr.
Moreover, it will turn out that the classical prebargaining set satisﬁes this property.
In order to obtain similar results for the semireactive bargaining set the notion of the
“imputation saving” reduced game (see Snijders (1995)) is useful. If (N,v) is a game,
∅ 6= S ⊆ N is a coalition and x ∈ X(N,v), then the imputation saving reduced game





vS,x(T), if |T| 6= 1
min{vS,x(T),x(T)}, if |T| = 1
.
Note that the imputation saving reduced game w.r.t. the grand coalition N leaves the
game unchanged, if and only if the proposal x is individually rational. Therefore we shall
require individual rationality, whenever imputation saving reduced games occur. These
considerations directly lead to the following modiﬁcations of the deﬁnitions of RGP and
CRGPsr.
A solution σ on a set Γ ⊆ ΓI
U of games with imputations satisﬁes the
(1) reduced game property w.r.t. imputation saving reduced games (RGP),
if the following condition holds: If (N,v) ∈ Γ, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, and x ∈ σ(N,v), then
(S,vS,x) ∈ Γ and xS ∈ σ(S,vS,x).
(2) converse reduced game property w.r.t. imputation saving reduced games
restricted to subgrand stable imputations (CRGPsr), if the following condi-
tion holds: If (N,v) ∈ Γ with |N| ≥ 2, if x ∈ I(N,v) is subgrand stable, and if for
every S ⊆ N with 1 ≤ |S| ≤ |N| − 1 the imputation saving reduced game (S,vS,x)
is a member of Γ and xS ∈ σ(S,vS,x), then x ∈ σ(N,v).
It is well-known that both, the classical and the reactive bargaining set on ΓI
U satisfy the
reduced game property w.r.t. imputation saving reduced games.
13Lemma 2.7 The semireactive bargaining set on ΓI
U satisﬁes (a) RGP and (b) CRGPsr.
Proof: Assertion (a) can be proved by literally copying – only the reduced game has
to be replaced by the imputation saving reduced game – the proof of Lemma 2.2. The
fact that the imputation saving reduced game (S,w) may only diﬀer from the reduced
game (S,w), where (S,w) is the game deﬁned in the proof of Lemma 2.6, on one-person
coalitions and the worth of a one-person coalition {i} diﬀers in both games, if and only
if w({i}) > xi, thus w({i}) = xi, shows that the proof of that lemma can be modiﬁed in
such a way that it proves (b). q.e.d.
In Section 3 it will be shown that the classical bargaining set satisﬁes and the reactive
bargaining set does not satisfy CRGPsr.
3 An Axiomatization of the Semireactive Bargaining
Set
This section is devoted to axiomatize the semireactive bargaining set and the semireactive
prebargaining set. We start with a characterization of the semireactive prebargaining set.
Theorem 3.1 The semireactive prebargaining set is the unique solution that satisﬁes NE,
PO, SGS, RGP and CRGPsr.
The following lemma is useful to prove Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 3.2 If σ is a solution that satisﬁes PO, SGS, and RGP, then it is a subsolution
of the semireactive prebargaining set.
Proof: Let σ have the required properties. By PO σ(N,v) ⊆ M∗
sr(N,v) holds true for
any one-person game of ΓU. We proceed by induction on the number |N| of players and
assume that the desired inclusion is already shown for all games with less than m players
for some m > 1. Let (N,v) ∈ ΓU be any m-person game and x ∈ σ(N,v). By RGP of σ
the restriction xs belongs to σ(S,vS,x) for every ∅ 6= S ⊆ N. This is true in particular, if
∅ 6= S ⊂ N, thus Lemma 2.6 yields x ∈ M∗
sr(N,v). q.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: The semireactive prebargaining set satisﬁes PO by deﬁnition.
It satisﬁes NE (see Section 1), RGP (by Lemma 2.2), SGS (by Lemma 2.4), and CRGPsr
(by Lemma 2.6). In order to prove the converse assertion, let σ be a solution that satisﬁes
the required properties. In view of Lemma 3.2 it remains to show that the semireactive
prebargaining set is a subsolution of σ. To this end let (N,v) ∈ ΓU and x ∈ M∗
sr(N,v).
If |N| = 1, then x ∈ σ(N,v) by PO and NE. We proceed by induction on |N| and
assume that the inclusion is already veriﬁed for all games with less than m persons for
some m > 1. If |N| = m, then xs ∈ σ(S,vS,x) for all ∅ 6= S ⊂ N by RGP of M∗
sr and
14the inductive hypothesis. Moreover, x is subgrand stable, because M∗
sr satisﬁes SGS. By
CRGPsr of σ we conclude x ∈ σ(N,v). q.e.d.
Note that PO and NE are only needed for one-person games. Indeed, if a solution satisﬁes
RGP and if it is Pareto optimal on one-person games, then it satisﬁes PO. Therefore it
is possible to replace PO and NE by one-person rationality. A solution σ on a set Γ of
games satisﬁes one-person rationality (OPR), if it contains a preimputation in the case of
a one-person game, i.e., σ(N,v) = {v(N)}, whenever |N| = 1.
The reactive prebargaining set satisﬁes SGS (see Lemma 2.4), NE, PO (see Section 1),
RGP (see Section 2), and does not coincide with the semireactive prebargaining set, if
|U| ≥ 4 (see Example 1.2), thus it does not satisfy CRGPsr. In Remark 5.5 it will be
shown that the prebargaining set satisﬁes CRGPsr, thus it does not satisfy SGS by the
same example, if |U| ≥ 4.
If |U| ≥ 2, then the following examples show the logical independence of NE, PO, SGS,
RGP, and CRGPsr. Indeed, if the universe consists of a single player only, then only NE
and PO are needed to show the theorem. The empty solution shows the independence
of NE. If Deﬁnition 1.1 is changed in such a way that only the requirement of Pareto
optimality is replaced by the requirement of feasibility (i.e., the phrase “all preimputations
x” is replaced by the phrase “all feasible payoﬀ vectors x”), then the solution satisﬁes all
properties except PO. The set of preimputations I∗ satisﬁes all properties except SGS.
The solution which assigns to any game with at least two players the set of all subgrand
stable feasible payoﬀ vectors and the singleton of imputations to every one-person game
satisﬁes all axioms except RGP. Finally the prekernel satisﬁes all axioms except CRGPsr.
It should be noted that we needed NE only once in the proof of Theorem 3.1, namely to
guarantee that a solution that satisﬁes the axioms contains the semireactive bargaining
set, if the attention is restricted to one-person games. Hence NE can be replaced by
“nonemptiness for one-person games”.
There is an analogon of Theorem 3.1 for the reactive bargaining set. A solution σ on Γ
is said to satisfy individual rationality (IR), if xi ≥ v({i}) for all (N,v) ∈ Γ, x ∈ σ(N,v),
and all i ∈ N.
Theorem 3.3 The semireactive bargaining set is the unique solution on ΓI
U that satisﬁes
NE, PO, IR, SGS, RGP, and CRGPsr.
Lemma 3.2 has the following analogon.
Lemma 3.4 If σ is a solution on ΓI
U that satisﬁes PO, IR, SGS, and RGP, then it is a
subsolution of the semireactive bargaining set.
Proof: The proof is very similar to the one of Lemma 3.2. IR is additionally needed,
because the current version of the converse reduced game property requires both, Pareto
optimality and individual rationality. q.e.d.
15Proof of Theorem 3.3: The semireactive bargaining set satisﬁes PO and IR by deﬁ-
nition. It satisﬁes NE (see Section 1), RGP and CRGPsr (by Lemma 2.7), and SGS (by
Lemma 2.4). The proof can be completed similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.1. Of course
the reduced game has to be replaced by the imputation saving reduced game. q.e.d.
Again NE is only used for one-person games. If the deﬁnition of the semireactive bar-
gaining set (see Deﬁnition 1.1) is changed in such a way that Pareto optimality is only
required for one-person games, then the arising solution satisﬁes all axioms except PO.
This example shows that Pareto optimality is also needed for two-person games. Thus
NE and PO cannot be replaced by OPR.
The same reasoning as above shows that the reactive bargaining set satisﬁes all axioms
of Theorem 3.3 except CRGPsr, if |U| ≥ 4. In Remark 5.5 it will be shown that the
prebargaining set satisﬁes CRGPsr, thus it does not satisfy SGS, if |U| ≥ 4.
Let |U| ≥ 2. The individually rational subsolutions of the solutions that show the inde-
pence of all axioms used in Theorem 3.1 also show the independence of all axioms used
in Theorem 3.3 except IR. The semireactive prebargaining set satisﬁes all axioms except
IR, if |U| ≥ 3. Indeed, it is well-known that the prekernel may not be individual rational
even in the three-person case and even if the game has an imputation. The fact that the
all mentioned prebargaining sets coincide with each other and with the bargaining sets for
two-person games, immediately shows that IR can be dropped as a condition in Theorem
3.3, if |U| ≤ 2.
4 The Semireactive Bargaining Set for Superadditive
Games
In this section all considered games (N,v) are superadditive, i.e., v(S)+v(T) ≤ v(S ∪T)
holds, whenever S ∩ T = ∅.
A game (N,v) is called a simple game, if it is monotonic and if v(N) = 1 and v(S) ∈
{0,1} ∀S ⊆ N. A winning coalition S satisﬁes v(S) = 1.
It is well known (and moreover easy to prove) that a simple game has a nonempty core if
and only if the set V of veto players is nonempty. Player i ∈ N is a veto player, if v(S) = 0
whenever i / ∈ S. The core of simple games with veto players consists of all distributions
of v(N) = 1 among the veto players, i.e., C(N,v) = {x ∈ I(N,v) | x(V ) = 1}.
In what follows we shall show that for arbitrary superadditive games the semireactive
prebargaining set satisﬁes IR. Moreover, for superadditive simple games the semireactive
bargaining set is the union of the core and the kernel. Granot, Granot, and Zhu (1997)
(Theorem 7) showed the same statement for the reactive bargaining set.
Theorem 4.1 If (N,v) is a superadditive game, then M∗
sr(N,v) = Msr(N,v). If (N,v)




C(N,v), if C(N,v) 6= ∅
K(N,v), if C(N,v) = ∅
.
16Proof: In order to show the ﬁrst assertion, let (N,v) be an arbitrary superadditive game.
If x ∈ I∗(N,v)\I(N,v), then there is a player k satisfying xk < v({k}). By superadditivity
every coalition of maximal excess contains k. Let P be a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion)
coalition with maximal excess. This maximal excess is positive, because e({k},x,v) > 0.
Moreover, by superadditivity and maximality, P contains all players j with xj ≤ v({j}).
By Pareto optimality P 6= N. Take l ∈ N \P and Q ∈ Tlk. Then e(Q,x,v) is not maximal
and Q can only be used in a counter objection if Q ∩ P = ∅ and e(Q,x,v) ≥ 0. This is
not possible by maximality of P. Thus k has a justiﬁed objection via P.
In order to show the second assertion let (N,v) be a superadditive simple game. We
distinguish the following cases.
(1) C(N,v) 6= ∅. Let x ∈ I(N,v) \ C(N,v). It remains to show that x 6∈ Msr(N,v). In
view of the fact that x does not belong to the core of (N,v), there is some player
l ∈ N \V satisfying xl > v({l}) = 0, where V denotes the set of veto players. With
P = N \{l} we come up with e(P,x,v) = 1−x(P) = 1−x(N)+xl = xl. Moreover,
e(Q,x,v) = −x(Q) ≤ −xl < 0 holds true for any Q ⊆ N satisfying l ∈ Q and
V \ Q 6= ∅. These observations directly show that every player in V has a justiﬁed
objection against l via P.
(2) C(N,v) = ∅. Let x ∈ I(N,v) \ K(N,v). It remains to show that x 6∈ Msr(N,v).
Indeed, there are distinct players k and l such that skl(x,v) > slk(x,v) and xl >
v({l}). By the absence of veto players we have e(N \ {k},x,v) = xk ≥ 0, thus
skl(x,v) > slk(x,v) ≥ 0. Let P ∈ Tkl be a maximal coalition with e(P,x,v) =
skl(x,v). For every coalition Q ∈ Tlk we have e(Q,x,v) < e(P,x,v) and, therefore,
Q can only be used in a counter objection if Q ∩ P = ∅ and e(Q,x,v) ≥ 0. Then Q
must be a winning coalition, because of xl > 0. However, disjoint winning coalitions
do not exist in a superadditive simple game. We conclude that k has a justiﬁed
objection against l via P. q.e.d.
Remark 4.2 Theorem 4.1 shows that the positive (pre)kernel of a superadditive simple
game coincides with its (semi)reactive (pre)bargaining set and with the union of the kernel
and the core.
Examples of simple superadditive games are apex games (an apex game has a distinguished
“strong” player such that a coalition is winning if it contains this strong player and
at least one additional “weak” player or if it contains all weak players), superadditive
weighted majority games in general (a superadditive weighted majority game (N,v) has
a representation (λ,m) satisfying 1/2 < λ ≤ 1, m ∈ I RN
+, m(N) = 1, and v(S) = 1, iﬀ
m(S) ≥ λ), and the seven person projective game (see von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1953) or Granot and Maschler (1997)). For the seven person projective game as well
as for apex games with more than two players the core is empty, thus the semireactive
prebargaining set coincides with the kernel in these cases.
As we have seen in Remark 4.2, the semireactive (pre)bargaining set, unlike the classical
(pre)bargaining set, satisﬁes REAS and, thus NPP, on superadditive simple games. The
following result shows that these properties hold even on superadditive nonsimple games.
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and satisﬁes the nullplayer property.
Proof: Let (N,v) be any superadditive game and x ∈ I∗(N,v). In view of Theorem 4.1
it remains to show that
xl > max
S⊆N\{l}
v(S ∪ {l}) − v(S) for some l implies x 6∈ M
∗(N,v).
Note that a coalition of highest excess does not contain player l. Let P ⊆ N be maximal
coalition of highest excess. In view of the fact that e(N \ {l},x,v) > e(N,x,v) = 0 we
have e(P,x,v) > 0. Take k ∈ P. Then P ∈ Tkl. An objection against l via P can not be
countered via Q ∈ Tlk, because such a coalition Q does not possess the highest excess and
P ∩Q = ∅ and e(Q,x,v) ≥ 0 is not possible by the maximality of P and superadditivity.
Thus k has a justiﬁed objection against l via P. q.e.d.
The following example shows that the second assertion of Theorem 4.1 cannot be gener-
alized to superadditive nonsimple games.
Example 4.4 Let N = {1,2,3,4,5} and (N,v) be given by
v(S) =

       
       
1, if S ∈ {{1,2,3,4},{1,2,4,5},{1,3,4,5},{1,3,4},{2,3,5},{1,2},{1,5}}
0, if S ∈ {N,∅,{1,2,3,5},{1,2,3},{1,2,4},{3,4},{4,5}}
−4, if S ∈ {{1,2,5},{1,3,5},{1,4,5},{2,3,4,5}}
−5, otherwise
.
It is easy to check that this game is superadditive and x = (0,...,0) is an imputation.
Furthermore, sij(x) = 1 for all pairs (i,j) 6= (4,1). The coalitions in the ﬁrst row separate
each pair of players (i,j) except (4,1) and s1,4(x) = 1 > s4,1(x) = 0. So, x is neither in
the core nor in the kernel of the game. It is nevertheless an element of the (semi)reactive
bargaining set. We only need to consider objections of player 1 against player 4 and, for
this purpose, only the coalitions {1,2} and {1,5} can be used. The coalition {3,4} is
disjoint from both coalitions and can counter every objection via {1,2} or {1,5}.
The literature provides several classes of superadditive balanced games for which the
bargaining set and the core coincide. These results immediately apply to the semireactive
and to the reactive (pre)bargaining set.
The following classes have been proved (see Solymosi (1999)) to have this property:
(1) convex games (Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1972)),
(2) strongly balanced partitioning games, including, e.g., assignment games and Γ-
component additive games (see Potters and Reijnierse (1995)),
(3) simple network games (for these games Granot (1994) and Granot, Granot, and Zhu
(1997) showed the coincidence of the core and the reactive bargaining set),
(4) nonnegative superadditive games (N,v) with a veto player (i.e. a player i such that
v(S) = 0 if i / ∈ S) (see Potters, Muto and Tijs (1988))
185 A Characterization of the Bargaining Set
In this section we show that SGS can be weakened in such a way that, together with
the accordingly modiﬁed versions of the converse reduced game property, the analogues
of Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 can be formulated to characterize the classical (pre)bargaining
set. Note that SGS is used to rule out justiﬁed objections via subgrand coalitions in the
sense of the semireactive bargaining set. A similar property for the bargaining set can be
deﬁned with the help of the following notions. If (N,v) is a game and x ∈ X(N,v), then,
for every player l ∈ N, we deﬁne
Tl(x) = {Q ⊆ N | l ∈ Q and e(Q,x,v) > 0}.
A collection Q ⊆ Tl(x) is less satisﬁed than N\{l}, if there is a mapping Q → I RQ, Q 7→
λQ > 0, such that
(1)
P
Q:k∈Q,Q∈Q λQ ≤ 1 for all k 6= l and
(2)
P
Q∈Q λQ e(Q,x,v) ≥ e(N\{l},x,v).
For any collection Q of coalitions we deﬁne the support by D(Q) =
S
Q∈Q Q. We use the
convention that N is the support of the empty collection.
Deﬁnition 5.1 A feasible payoﬀ vector x ∈ X(N,v) of a game (N,v) is subgrand
stable in the sense of the bargaining set (satisﬁes SGS1) if, for all l ∈ N with
xl > v({l}) and x(N \ {l}) < v(N \ {l}), the intersection of the supports D(Q) of all
collections Q ⊆ Tl(x) less satisﬁed than N \ {l} consists of player l only. A solution σ
on a set Γ of games satisﬁes SGS1, if for all games (N,v) ∈ Γ all members x ∈ σ(N,v)
satisfy SGS1.
If Q ∈ Tl(x), then, by putting λQ = 1, it follows that {Q} is less satisﬁed than N \ {l}.
Hence, “SGS” (see Deﬁnition 2.3) implies “SGS1”.
Lemma 5.2 Let (N,v) be a game and x ∈ I∗(N,v). Then x satisﬁes SGS1, if and only
if there are no distinct players k and l of N such that k possesses a justiﬁed objection
against l at x via N \ {l} in the sense of the bargaining set.
Proof: Let x ∈ X(N,v) and suppose that a player k ∈ N\{l} has a justiﬁed objection
against player l via N \{l}, i.e., a justiﬁed objection of the form (N \{l},xN\{l} +z). We
conclude that z satisﬁes z > > 0 and z(N \ {l}) = e(N \ {l},x,v). As l has no counter
objection, we have x(Q) + z(Q \ {l}) > v(Q) for all Q ∈ Tlk.
19We prove that k ∈ D(Q) for every collection Q ⊆ Tl(x) that is less satisﬁed than N\{l}.
Indeed, take weights (λQ)Q∈Q as in the deﬁnition. Then





Q:k/ ∈Q,Q∈Q λQz(Q \ {l}) +
P
Q:k∈Q,Q∈Q λQe(Q,x,v)
≤ z(N \ {k,l}) +
P
Q:k∈Q,Q∈Q λQe(Q,x,v)
< e(N \ {l},x,v) +
P
Q:k∈Q,Q∈Q λQe(Q,x,v)
and, thus, k ∈ D(Q).
In order to prove the converse implication, suppose that x ∈ X(N,v), xl > v({l}) and
x(N \ {l}) < v(N \ {l}).
If k is a member of the supports D(Q) of all collections Q less satisﬁed than N\{l}, then
it suﬃces to prove that player k has a justiﬁed objection against player l via coalition
N \ {l}. In order to show this claim we shall show that there is a vector z ∈ IRN\{l}
with z > > 0, z(N \ {l}) = e(N \ {l},x,v) and x(Q) + z(Q \ {l}) > v(Q) for all coalitions
Q ∈ Tlk.








+, if S 6= N0
e(N \ {l},x,v), if S = N0
.
If there exists a core element ˆ z of (N0,u) satisfying ˆ z(S) > u(S) for all ∅ 6= S ⊂ N0,
then there is z ∈ I RN\{l} with zN0 ≤ ˆ z and z(S) > u(S) for all ∅ 6= S ⊂ N0 such that
z(N0) < ˆ z(N0) and z(N \ {l}) = u(N0), thus z > > 0. Indeed, zk = ˆ z(N0) − z(N0) =
u(N0) − z(N0) > 0. Then (N \ {l},xN\{l} + z) is a justiﬁed objection of k against l.
Therefore, it remains to prove that the interior of the core of (N0,u) is nonempty. By a
slight modiﬁcation of the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem (see Bondareva (1963) or Shapley




0) whenever λS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ N





(Here 1S denotes the indicator function of S in N0.) In order to show this assertion let
(λS)S⊂N0 satisfy λS ≥ 0 and
P
S⊂N0 λS1S = 1N0. Then Q = {S ∪ {l} | S ⊂ N0,λS >
0,u(S) > 0} ∈ Tl(x) by deﬁnition. Moreover, k / ∈ D(Q). With λQ := λS, whenever
Q = S ∪ {l} for any S ⊂ N0, we obtain
P
Q:j∈Q,Q∈Q λQ ≤ 1 for all j ∈ N \ {l}. By our






λQu(Q \ {l}) =
X
Q∈Q
λQe(Q,x,v) < e(N \ {l},x,v) = u(N
0)
ﬁnishes the proof. q.e.d.
Corollary 5.3 The (pre)bargaining set satisﬁes SGS1.
20The new version of subgrand stability is used to deﬁne the suitable version of the converse
reduced game property. Indeed, CRGP1 is deﬁned as CRGPsr (see Deﬁnition 2.5), unless
the expression “if x ∈ I∗(N,v) satisﬁes subgrand stability” is replaced by “if x ∈ I∗(N,v)
satisﬁes SGS1”. Moreover, CRGP1 is the property which arises from CRGP1 by replacing
the reduced game by the imputation saving reduced game.
Lemma 5.4 The prebargaining set satisﬁes CRGP1 and the bargaining set satisﬁes
CRGP1.
Proof: In order to show that the (pre)bargaining set satisﬁes the asserted version of the
converse reduced game property, let (N,v) be a game and x ∈ I∗(N,v) satisfy SGS1. If
player k has a justiﬁed objection (P,y) against some other player l at x in the sense of
the bargaining set, then P 6= N \ {l} by Lemma 5.2. Take j ∈ N \ (P ∪ {l}), denote by
S = N \{j} the set of remaining players, and let w = vS,x denote the coalitional function
of the reduced game. The fact that e({j,l},x,v) < 0 directly implies w({l}) < xl, thus
(P,y) is a justiﬁed objection against l even w.r.t. the reduced game. The imputation
saving reduced game (S,vS,x) can be treated in the same way. q.e.d.
Remark 5.5 A solution σ that satisﬁes CRGP1 or CRGP1 also satisﬁes CRGPsr or
CRGPsr, respectively, because SGS implies SGS1. Hence, by Lemma 5.4, M∗ and M
satisfy CRGPsr and CRGPsr, respectively.
Theorem 5.6 (1) The prebargaining set M∗ is the unique solution that satisﬁes NE,
PO, SGS1, RGP and CRGP1.
(2) The bargaining set M is the unique solution on ΓI
U that satisﬁes NE, PO, IR,
SGS1, RGP, and CRGP1.
Proof: Both solutions satisfy SGS1 by Lemma 5.2. Lemma 5.4 shows that they satisfy
the asserted versions of the converse reduced game property. It is well-known that the
remaining properties are satisﬁed.
Uniqueness can be proved as uniqueness was shown in the proofs of Theorem 3.1 and
Theorem 3.3. q.e.d.
Note that OPR can be used to replace PO and NE in assertion (1) of Theorem 5.6. Suit-
able modiﬁcations of the examples presented in Section 3 show the logical independence
of the axioms in both assertions.
6 Concluding Remarks
Remark 1: It is possible to extend the deﬁnition of the semireactive prebargaining set to
TU games with coalition structures. In order to do so the set of (pre)imputations (with
respect to the grand coalition) has to be replaced by the set of (pre)imputations with
21respect to the coalition structure (see, e.g., Granot and Maschler (1997)). For simplicity
reasons we only considered the case in which the coalition structure is trivial, i.e., consists
of the grand coalition.
Remark 2: There is a set-valued dynamic system leading to the semireactive (pre)bar-
gaining set. In view of the fact that Section 8 of Granot and Maschler (1997) can suitably
be modiﬁed in order to generate analogous results for the semireactive bargaining set, we
only present a very brief description of the dynamic system. Let (N,v) be a TU game






(min{e(P,x,v),−e(Q,x,v)})+, if P ∩ Q = ∅

1/2 · (e(P,x,v) − e(Q,x,v))

+, otherwise







Moreover, y ∈ I RN is said to arise from x by a d-bounded transfer (from l to k), if there
exists 0 ≤ α ≤ dkl(x) such that
yi =

     
     
xk + α, if i = k
xl − α, if i = l
xi, otherwise
.
The dynamic system ϕ is the correspondence on I∗(N,v) deﬁned by
ϕ(x) = {y ∈ I R
N | y arises from x by a d-bounded transfer}.
By (1.4) the semireactive prebargaining set coincides with the set of endpoints, i.e.,
M
∗
sr(N,v) = {x ∈ I
∗(N,v) | ϕ(x) = {x}}.
A trajectory is a sequence (xm)m∈I N such that xm+1 arises from xm by a d-bounded transfer.
The trajectory is maximal, if inﬁnitely often the size of the transfer from xm to xm+1 is
at least δ · maxk,l∈N, k6=l dkl(xm) for some δ > 0. Applying some results of Maschler and
Peleg (1976) (see also Stearns (1968)) we obtain the following assertions. Every maximal
trajectory converges to an element of the semireactive prebargaining set. Moreover, if
the attention is restricted to imputations only (and if there are imputations), then every
maximal trajectory converges to an element of the semireactive bargaining set.
Remark 3: It should be noted that the deﬁnition of the semireactive (pre)bargaining set
can be extended to cooperative games without transferable utility. Indeed, if the notion
of objections and counter objections is taken from, e.g., Asscher (1976), then it is obvious
how to generalize Deﬁnition 1.1.
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